The 800 Pound Gorilla Sleeps: The Federal Government\u27s Lackadaisical Liability and Compensation Policies in the Context of Pre-Event Vaccine Immunization Programs by Greenberger, Michael
Journal of Health Care Law and Policy
Volume 8 | Issue 1 Article 3
The 800 Pound Gorilla Sleeps: The Federal
Government's Lackadaisical Liability and
Compensation Policies in the Context of Pre-Event
Vaccine Immunization Programs
Michael Greenberger
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jhclp
Part of the Health Law Commons, Preventative Medicine Commons, and the Science and
Technology Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Health
Care Law and Policy by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael Greenberger, The 800 Pound Gorilla Sleeps: The Federal Government's Lackadaisical Liability and Compensation Policies in the
Context of Pre-Event Vaccine Immunization Programs, 8 J. Health Care L. & Pol'y 7 (2005).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jhclp/vol8/iss1/3
ARTICLES
THE 800 POUND GORILLA SLEEPS: THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT'S LACKADAISICAL LIABILITY AND
COMPENSATION POLICIES IN THE CONTEXT OF PRE-EVENT
VACCINE IMMUNIZATION PROGRAMS
MICHAEL GREENBERGER* ©
INTRODUCTION
Three years after September 11, 2001, the United States is beginning to
implement a biodefense strategy. The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases (NIAID) is providing substantial research grants to universities so that
they can, inter alia, research next generation biodefense vaccines.' In addition, on
July 21, 2004, President Bush signed the Project Bioshield Act, which authorizes
the spending of $5.6 billion to advance the development and acquisition of
vaccines and other countermeasures to biological agents. 2  Currently, a next-
generation smallpox vaccine is in Phase I trials and an Ebola vaccine is slated to
begin Phase I trials soon.3 Furthermore, it is the Bush Administration's goal to
develop at least two countermeasures for each of the Category A bioterrorism
agents, as listed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.4 These are but
a few of the federal government's efforts. While the funding and progress are
welcome signs for our national defense, the federal pre-event Phase I smallpox
vaccination program for first responders recently demonstrated that other serious
* Law School Professor, University of Maryland; Director, University of Maryland Center for Health
and Homeland Security. A.B., Lafayette College; J.D., University of Pennsylvania. I would like to
thank Christopher Gozdor, J.D., and Jeffrey Gilberg, J.D., Law Fellows of the University of Maryland
Center for Health and Homeland Security, for their assistance in preparing this article.
1. Press Release, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, HHS Announces New
Regional Centers for Biodefense Research (Sept. 4, 2003), http://www2.niaid.nih.gov/Newsroom/
Releases/hhsrce.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
2. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President at the signing ofS.15 - Project Bioshield
Act of 2004, 40 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1346, 1347 (July 21, 2004),
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2004_residential-documents&docid =
pd26jyO4_txt-12.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
3. Mike Nartker, NIH Official Touts Progress on Biological Defenses, GOv'T EXEC., June 10,
2004, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0604/061004gsn I.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
4. Id.
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obstacles remain to the implementation of a successful pre-event vaccination
program - namely, the federal government's inability to provide both sufficient
liability protection for vaccine administrators and also adequate compensation to
those injured by the vaccine.
This article grows out of my work on a recently published, interdisciplinary,
and peer reviewed article in the Journal of Homeland Security, The Threat of
Smallpox: Eradicated but Not Erased,5 that discussed the failure of the federal
Phase I smallpox vaccination program - a program launched on January 24, 2003
to preemptively vaccinate 500,000 civilian first responders against smallpox with
an existing smallpox vaccine.6 The most recent data as of this writing reveals that
only 39,608 people have been vaccinated under the auspices of the federal Phase I
7program.
The Threat of Smallpox grew out of a field study of several states' health
departments, performed at the Analytical Services, Inc. (ANSER).8 Subsequent
analysis of that data revealed that three principal problems were to blame for the
failure of the Phase I smallpox vaccination effort: overextended public health and
hospital resources; an uncertain risk benefit calculus that likely preceded a decision
to take the smallpox vaccine; and, the single largest obstacle to Phase I's success,
an inadequate federal liability and compensation scheme to effectively remedy
injuries stemming from the vaccine. 9 The first two findings are described very
briefly below. This article, however, greatly expands the third finding of the
ANSER study and offers suggestions to create a robust, yet well-tailored, liability
and compensation regime, which would help ensure success of future pre-event
biodefense vaccination programs.l°
As mentioned above, the first reason for Phase I's failure was that it further
strained already burdened public health and hospital resources." Aside from the
Phase I initiative, public health departments had many other problems to consider,
including a panoply of chronic and emerging diseases.' 2 In addition to those
existing duties, the federal government initially asked states to implement Phase I
with Fiscal Year 2002 funding that had already been encumbered for other
5. Holly Myers et al., The Threat of Smallpox: Eradicated but Not Erased, J. HOMELAND
SECURITY (Feb. 20, 2004), at http://www.homelandsecurity.org/joumal/articles/gurskysmallpox.html
(last visited Feb. 24, 2005) [hereinafter The Threat of Smallpox].
6. Id.
7. See OFFICE OF COMMUNICATION, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, SMALLPOX VACCINATION
PROGRAM STATUS BY STATE (Jan. 31, 2005), http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/spvaccin.htm (last
visited Feb. 24, 2005) [hereinafter CDC SMALLPOX PROGRAM BY STATE]. These figures are now
updated on the web on a monthly basis. Id.
8. The Threat of Smallpox, supra note 5.
9. Id
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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purposes. 13 As a result, public health departments had little capacity to take on a
full-fledged smallpox vaccination program that had not been utilized in civilian life
for over thirty years.
14
The second finding from The Threat of Smallpox was that the risk of injury
posed by the smallpox vaccine versus the general uncertainty over the threat of
smallpox being used as a weapon also contributed to low numbers of first
responders volunteering for vaccination.' 5 When smallpox ran rampant in the
world, thirty percent of those who contracted the disease died. 16 In today's world,
one free of smallpox (except for the known samples stored at the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia and the Vector facility in
Russia), the risk of being infected by smallpox from a bioterrorist attack is
virtually unknown. 17 But, in contrast, the risk of being harmed or killed by the
smallpox vaccine is certainly calculable. 18 Because study participants felt that they
received poor communication from the Bush Administration about the threat of a
smallpox attack, it was difficult for prospective Phase I volunteer vaccinees to
accept the vaccine's risks of harm or death. 19
Finally, The Threat of Smallpox explained that liability and compensation
concerns were the biggest roadblocks to full participation in the Phase I smallpox
initiative.20 Liability coverage was ambiguous for certain parties, and those injured
or killed by the vaccine were initially given very little chance of receiving
compensation from the federal government.2' When the federal government
belatedly offered a compensation package to those harmed by the smallpox vaccine
under the Phase I program, it was not enough to attract volunteers. As of this
writing, Phase I has not even achieved one tenth of its goal of vaccinating 500,000
first responders against smallpox.
22
If the government is serious about developing a successful biodefense
strategy, it must begin by implementing a successful pre-event vaccination
program. In order to do so, the federal government must provide the financial
support necessary to both protect manufacturers, sellers, and distributors of the
vaccine from liability and also compensate those injured by the vaccination. A
pre-event program that does not include both of these characteristics is destined to
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Participants in the ANSER study felt that the threat of smallpox being used as a weapon was
never adequately communicated to them. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See CDC SMALLPOX PROGRAM BY STATE, supra note 7.
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fail. Although the cost of providing both liability protection and also adequate
compensation at the pre-event stage may seem large, it pales in comparison to what
the cost would be should an outbreak occur without the benefit of vaccinated first
responders.
For example, at the pre-event stage, the targeted vaccination population is
relatively small and the threat of the disease is virtually unknown. In contrast, at
the post-event stage, the targeted population becomes enormous, the threat of
contracting the disease suddenly becomes very real, and, as a result, the cost of
confronting the problem increases astronomically. 23 In order to avoid post-event
catastrophe, it is imperative for the government to minimize the risks associated
with both administering and receiving the vaccine. The government can achieve
this by providing liability protection to administrators and adequate compensation
to those injured by the vaccination.
The remainder of this paper will analyze past and current vaccine liability and
compensation regimes as a basis for suggesting changes for future pre-event
vaccination programs.24 These programs are important because they are the most
effective (and, in the case of smallpox, the only) method of confronting the threat
of an outbreak. In order to implement a successful pre-event vaccination program,
the government must begin by assuming more of the risk, on behalf of both
providers and first responders.
1. THE REGRESSING GENEROSITY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN ITS
VACCINE LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION REGIMES
The United States government has implemented three primary vaccine
liability and compensation schemes over recent years. Ranging from the National
Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976 to the most recent Phase I Smallpox
Vaccination Program, the government's willingness to provide liability protection
23. A recent study has indicated that at the post-event stage, only forty-three percent of the
American people would go to a vaccination site to get vaccinated after a smallpox outbreak. ROZ D.
LASKER, THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF MEDICINE, REDEFINING READINESS: TERRORISM PLANNING
THROUGH THE EYES OF THE PUBLIC 8 (2004) The study, which stems from a random telephone survey
of 2,545 adult residents of the continental United States, offers four reasons why most people are
unlikely to cooperate: (i) people are not worried about catching the disease; (ii) people do not trust what
government officials say or do; (iii) people are worried about the vaccine's risks; and, (iv) people have
conflicting worries about getting the disease and getting sick from the vaccine. Id. at 8-14. As the
study asserts, fear - of getting vaccinated, of the disease itself, or both - is a significant obstacle to post-
event cooperation. Id. at 15-18.
24. Liability and compensation for post-event biodefense vaccinations, though important, are
beyond the scope of this article. As discussed above, the risk-benefit calculus for post-event biodefense
vaccinations changes too dramatically to include in this discussion of pre-event biodefense
vaccinations.
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and vaccine compensation has dwindled, primarily due to financial considerations.
However, as bioterrorism continues to threaten the nation's homeland security, it is
becoming increasingly important for the government to rediscover much of the
financial liberality - particularly at the pre-event stage - that it has lost along the
way. Otherwise, the nation will be ill-equipped to adequately and sufficiently
handle an outbreak of an infectious disease.
A. The National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976
The National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976 [hereinafter the
Swine Flu Act] was the federal government's first foray into a vaccine liability and
compensation program. Fear of a flu pandemic began in January of 1976 when
four cases of swine flu were discovered at Fort Dix, New Jersey. This raised
grave concerns in the public health community because the community feared a
repeat of the swine flu pandemic that had killed millions in 1918_1919.26 While
neither a swine flu epidemic nor a pandemic materialized in the early months of
1976 (the flu season generally runs from September though March),27 Congress
quickly authorized the procurement of nearly 200 million doses of the swine flu
vaccine in April of 1976.28
Concerns over vaccine manufacturer liability did not arise until insurers
declared that they would end coverage for vaccine manufacturers as of June 30,
1976.29 This refusal stemmed in large part from the case of Reyes v. Wyeth
Laboratories, which held polio vaccine manufacturers strictly liable for failing to
provide product warnings directly to vaccinees which would have allowed
vaccinees to assess the risks of the vaccine.3 ° Insurers maintained that it would be
cost prohibitive to litigate "frivolous suits" for strict liability; therefore, they could
not offer that kind of insurance to vaccine manufacturers.
31
A swine flu manufacturer indemnification bill went to Congress on June 16,
1976, but Congress did not act on it because of the government's reluctance to
25. Arnold W. Reitze, Federal Compensation for Vaccination Induced Injuries, 13 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 169, 171 (1986).
26. See id. at 170 (noting that 500,000 Americans died in 1918-1919 from the swine flu, which
paled in comparison to the estimated twenty million who died worldwide from the disease).
27. Alvarez v. U.S., 495 F. Supp. 1188, 1190 (D. Colo. 1980) (citing U.S. COMPTROLLER GEN.,
THE SWINE FLU PROGRAM: AN UNPRECEDENTED VENTURE IN PREVENTIVE MEDICINE (1977)).
28. Reitze, supra note 25, at 173.
29. Id. at 175.
30. 498 F.2d 1264, 1295 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974). Such a warning was
required when the manufacturer had reason to know that the vaccinator would not be using
"individualized medical judgment" concerning potential harm to the vaccinee. Reitze, supra note 25, at
175-76 (citing Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1277).
31. Alvarez, 495 F. Supp. at 1191 n.6 (citing RICHARD E. NEUSTADT & HARVEY V. FEINBERG,
THE SWINE FLU AFFAIR 58-59 (1978)).
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accept the financial responsibility. 32 As a result, swine flu manufacturers stopped
producing the vaccine that would potentially save the lives of thousands, if not
millions, of Americans if the swine flu returned for the fall flu season.3 However,
Congress eventually passed the Swine Flu Act a4 on August 12, 1976, largely as a
result of the fear created by the discovery of Legionnaires Disease on August 1,
1976. 35 Not only did the Swine Flu Act provide liability protection, which
changed the risk benefit calculus for the manufacturers, it also created federally
funded compensation for those harmed by the vaccine.3 6  Through its action,
Congress hoped to ensure that a sufficient number of swine flu vaccines would be
available to inoculate an overwhelming majority of the American population. 7
1. Liability Protections
The Swine Flu Act protected manufacturers and distributors of the swine flu
vaccine, as well as those who administered the vaccine.3 8 Plaintiffs asserted claims
directly against the United States through the Federal Tort Claims Act rather than
against the alleged "wrongdoer," 39 and the United States assumed the liability of
manufacturers, distributors, and vaccinators, "based on any theory of liability...
including negligence, strict liability in tort, and breach of warranty." 40 In addition,
the courts consistently interpreted the "any theory of liability" language as
establishing a no-fault compensation system that made the government liable to all
plaintiffs who could demonstrate that their injuries were caused by the swine flu
vaccine. 4 1 However, the United States would seek indemnification from negligent
organizations or individuals covered by the Swine Flu Act's liability protections.42
32. Reitze, supra note 25, at 175.
33. Id.
34. National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat. 1113
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 247b (West 2003 & Supp. 2004)).
35. Reitze, supra note 25, at 178-79.
36. Unthank v. United States, 732 F.2d 1517, 1519 (10th Cir. 1984) (quoting Unthank v. United
States, 533 F. Supp. 703, 719 (D. Utah 1982)). In fact, Congress accomplished this after only two days'
consideration, without prior hearings or a committee report. Id.
37. Reitze, supra note 25, at 173.
38. National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-380, § 2, 90 Stat. 1113,
1114-15 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 247b (West 2003 & Supp. 2004)).
39. Alvarez v. U.S., 495 F. Supp. 1188, 1190 (D. Colo. 1980).
40. National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-380, § 2, 90 Stat. at 1115
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 247b (West 2003 & Supp. 2004)).
41. EDWARD P. RICHARDS ET AL., SMALLPOX VACCINE INJURY LAW PROJECT, SMALLPOX
VACCINE INJURY AND LAW GUIDE 7 (June 7,2004), http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/bt/smallpox/
svIaw.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
42. National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-380 § 2, 90 Stat. at 1117
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 247b (West 2003 & Supp. 2004)).
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2. Compensation Provisions
Claimants had an exclusive remedy for compensation against the federal
government for personal injury or death arising from the swine flu vaccine.43
Because the Swine Flu Act used the Federal Tort Claims Act as a vehicle for
liability and compensation, claimants first had to file an administrative claim with
the agency before proceeding to federal district court. 4 The Swine Flu Act did not
place limits on the amount of an award that could be obtained.45
3. Results of the Swine Flu Act of 1976
The swine flu vaccination program was successful in terms of getting a large
number of people vaccinated in a short period. During the two-month run of the
program, over forty million Americans - nearly a third of the adult population of
the United States - received the swine flu vaccination.46 However, a vast field of
vaccine injury litigation subsequently began in which attorneys and medical
experts readily attributed injuries to the vaccine. 47 By 1985, the government had
paid out $90 million to those that developed Guillain-Barre syndrome, an often
reversible, but sometimes fatal, form of paralysis, which had been attributed to the
swine flu vaccine. 48 As a result, the government became increasingly reluctant to
assume the financial risks associated with vaccination initiatives.
B. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986
Prior to 1986, the number of manufacturers making childhood vaccines had
"declined significantly.'"49 In addition, the early 1980s exhibited an increase in
vaccine tort litigation, which in part grew out of the fact that injuries previously
unrecognized as arising from childhood vaccines were starting to be connected to
those vaccines.50 Injured children "often" did not have a source of compensation
for their injuries, so these children and their families turned to the legal system for
help. 5' At the time, vaccine manufacturers faced grave difficulty in obtaining
liability insurance, which caused one vaccine manufacturer to stop producing
43. National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-380 § 2, 90 Stat. at 1115
(codified as amended in 42 U.S.C.A. § 247b (West 2003 & Supp. 2004)).
44. Alvarez, 495 F. Supp. at 1191 n.8.
45. See generally, 42 U.S.C.A. § 247b (West 2003 & Supp. 2004)).
46. David Brown, A Shot in the Dark: Swine Flu's Vaccine Lessons, WASH. POST, May 27, 2002,
at A9.
47. RICHARDS ET AL., supra note 41.
48. Brown, supra note 46.
49. H.R. REP. No. 99-908, pt. 1, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6345.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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vaccines temporarily in 1984.52 Others were threatening to follow suit. 53 Because
"the withdrawal of even a single manufacturer would present the very real
possibility of vaccine shortages, 54  Congress once again involved the federal
government in vaccine liability and compensation through the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (NCVIA). 5   However, NCVIA's liability and
compensation provisions were crafted differently from the Swine Flu Act, largely
due to the government's increasing reluctance to accept financial responsibility.
56
Specifically, NCVIA established a two-staged, no fault compensation system
for specific childhood vaccines (exclusive of the smallpox vaccine).57 The first
stage was a mandatory "no-fault" system, administered by a special master of the
federal district court, which compensated specific injuries resulting from childhood
vaccination. 58 This administrative hearing provided compensation regardless of
the party alleged to have caused the injury, and the respondent was always the
United States.59
However, unlike the Swine Flu Act of 1976, which did not limit awards,
NCVIA capped certain types of awards.60 Under the no-fault system in NCVIA,
the plaintiff could recover actual unreimbursable and reasonable projected
unreimbursable expenses, such as medical expenses, lost wages, reasonable
attorneys' fees, and secondary transmission costs; but, "actual and projected" pain
and suffering were limited to $250,000.61 Awards for a vaccinee's death were
capped at $250,000.62 Both of the aforementioned caps were adjusted for inflation
in accordance with the Consumer Price Index.63  Lost wages were explicitly
limited to "compensation for actual and anticipated loss of earnings determined in
accordance with generally recognized actuarial principles and projections" for
52. Id. at 6, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6347.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6348. At the time NCVIA was being debated
in Congress, "there [was] only one manufacturer of the polio vaccine, one manufacturer of the measles,
mumps, rubella (MMR) vaccine, and two manufacturers of the DPT vaccine." Id. In addition,
Michigan and Massachusetts had the ability to produce DPT vaccine. Id. Even with these
manufacturers operational, the Centers for Disease Control and Preventioin's vaccine stockpile had
never reached the recommended six month supply. Id.
55. H.R. REP. No. 99-908, pt. I, at 3, 7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6348.
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3756 (1986) (codified at
42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-I to 300aa-33 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004).
56. The Threat of Smallpox, supra note 5.
57. Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: An
Ad Hoc Remedy or a Window for the Future?, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 387, 389-90 (1987).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
61. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-15(a)(4) (West 2003 & Supp. 2004).
62. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-15(a)(2).
63. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-18 (repealed 1987).
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those injured by a vaccine after turning eighteen years old.64 Those injured before
turning eighteen could recover lost wages in anticipation of turning 18 in amounts
based on "the average gross weekly earnings of workers in the private, non-farm
sector, less appropriate taxes and the average cost of a health insurance policy.
65
Although this was a limitation, injured parties could generally recover lost wages
without the benefit of knowing what their actual wages would have been.
If unsatisfied with an administrative award, the plaintiff could enter NCVIA's
second stage66 and commence traditional tort litigation against the vaccine
manufacturer. 6 7 However, Congress hoped to avoid the litigation alternative by
providing a compulsory, no-fault, quick, and fair administrative system in which
injured parties could be compensated.68 If a plaintiff chose litigation, Congress
made certain alterations to traditional tort law to protect vaccine manufacturers, as
the government would not pay awards that arose from litigation. 69 First, the
manufacturer was not liable for injuries or death that resulted from "unavoidable"
side effects that were inherent in properly prepared, labeled, and administered
vaccines. 70 Next, Congress legislatively altered the rule established in Reyes71 by
declaring that childhood vaccine manufacturers were not liable for failing to
provide such warnings. 72  Rather, simply providing those warnings to the
administering physician or nurse was adequate. 73 Protection of this sort was
important, given that insurers dropped vaccine manufacturers from coverage
largely because of the Reyes rule during the swine flu crisis in 1976.74 Finally, a
manufacturer was immune from punitive damages in a civil trial if it complied with
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Public Health Service Act when
manufacturing the vaccine, unless the manufacturer engaged in fraudulent,
wrongful, or criminal action when submitting information for the vaccine's
approval.75 Congress created none of these presumptions when it enacted the
Swine Flu Act.
A final retreat from the generosity of the Swine Flu Act was that NCVIA
made its compensation secondary to state and private sources of compensation as
64. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-15(a)(3)(A).
65. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-15(a)(3)(B).
66. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-21(a) (West 2003).
67. Id.
68. Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 57, at 391-92.
69. Id. at 392-93.
70. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-22(c) (West 2003).
71. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
72. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-22(c).
73. See id.
74. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
75. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-23(d) (West 2003).
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well as federal sources.7 6 NCVIA clearly stated that the federal government had
liability in this area secondary to state compensation programs; private or public
health benefits; private insurance; state "health benefits programs. 77 In contrast,
under the Swine Flu Act, the "exclusive remedy" was an action directly against the
United States.78
As demonstrated above, NCVIA was more stringent in terms of liability and
compensation compared to the Swine Flu Act. While NCVIA did have a no fault
liability and compensation system, as did the Swine Flu Act, NCVIA's litigation
stage potentially exposed vaccine manufacturers and others to liability, if claimants
were not satisfied with their administrative awards.79 In the Swine Flu Act, the
federal government still inserted itself as the defendant and paid the awards if a
plaintiff decided to take a case to federal district court.80 Also, unlike the Swine
Flu Act, NCVIA limited awards for pain and suffering, death, and lost wages
through its no fault administrative process 8' and disallowed punitive damages in
most cases, if a claimant chose to litigate in court.82 Finally, NCVIA made its
compensation secondary to federal, state, and private compensation programs,
whereas the Swine Flu Act did not reduce awards because of contributions from
collateral sources. 83 Consequently, NCVIA's limitations clearly demonstrate that
Congress "learned a lesson" from the "open-ended" liability of the Swine Flu Act
and wanted to limit expenditures for injuries and deaths resulting from childhood
vaccines under NCVIA.84
C. Phase I Smallpox Vaccination Program
Believing that regimes and persons hostile to the United States may possess
Variola major, the etiologicial agent of smallpox, President Bush announced the
Phase I smallpox vaccination program in December of 2002 - a program which
aspired to vaccinate 500,000 first responders against smallpox. 85  While the
76. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-15(f)-(g) (West 2003 & Supp. 2004).
77. Id.
78. Charles F. Hagan, Vaccine Compensation Schemes, 45 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 477, 478
(1990).
79. See The Threat of Smallpox, supra note 5.
80. Id.
81. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-15(a), (b).
82. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-23(d) (West 2003).
83. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-15(g), (h) (West 2003 & Supp. 2004).
84. Although NCVIA was intended to be a model for vaccine liability and compensation, some
feel that it has become too adversarial and is in need of reform. See, e.g., Clifford J. Shoemaker, A Call
to Arms (Apr. 9, 2003), at http://www.attomeyaccess.net/MealeysPaperre_VaccineLitigation.htm
(last visited Feb. 24, 2005) (citing difficulties such as proving causation and limitations on attorneys
fees).
85. Press Release, The White House, President Delivers Remarks on Smallpox (Dec. 13, 2002),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021213-7.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2005)
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smallpox vaccine had been used routinely in America until 1972,86 few in today's
medical field have any experience administering the smallpox vaccine. 87  In
addition, the smallpox vaccine available for the Phase I program has been referred
to as the "least safe human vaccine" available today.88
Given the problems endemic to the smallpox vaccine, Congress and the
President knew they had to protect a variety of entities and persons from liability
and compensate those injured or killed by the vaccine. 8 9  Otherwise, the Phase I
smallpox vaccination program would likely fail. However, for reasons discussed
below, Congress cobbled together a new liability and compensation scheme for
Phase I several months after the program began. Even when Congress finally
completed that package, it was insufficient to attract vaccinees and/or providers to
the Phase I program.
1. Liability and Compensation Provisions
Initially, the Phase I smallpox vaccination program relied upon Section 304
of the Homeland Security Act of 200290 (passed in November 2002) as its vehicle
for providing liability protection and compensation to injured vaccinees. However,
the liability protection afforded was ambiguous and the compensation available to
those injured was inadequate.
With regard to liability, Section 304 provided protection to manufacturers,
distributors, persons authorized to administer the vaccine, or an "official, agent, or
employee of a person described" in the first three categories. 91 While this clearly
gave liability protection to some, others questioned their coverage under Section
[hereinafter White House Press Release]; David McGlinchey, CDC Says It Never Aimed for 500,000
Smallpox Vaccinations, GOV'T EXEC., Feb. 26, 2003, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0203/022603
gsn I .htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
86. CDC, SMALLPOX FACT SHEET VACCINE OVERVIEW (2003), at hup://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/
smallpox/vaccination/facts.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2005) (stating that smallpox has a fatality rate of
approximately 30%).
87. The Threat of Smallpox, supra note 5; see also CDC, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT
SMALLPOX VACCINE (Dec. 29, 2004), at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/vaccination/faq.asp
(last visited Feb. 24, 2005) (noting that "routine vaccination of the American public against smallpox
stopped in 1972").
88. Susan J. Landers, Smallpox Vaccine Hazards Dictate Cautious Approach, 45 AM. MED. NEWS,
Aug. 19, 2002, http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2002/08/19/hlsbO8l9.htm (last visited Feb. 24,
2005) (quoting Anthony Fauci, Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases).
89. See White House Press Release, supra note 85 (acknowledging the risk of serious health
concerns by being vaccinated).
90. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2165 (2002) (codified as
amended in 3 U.S.C.A.; 5 U.S.C.A.; 6 U.S.C.A.; 7 U.S.C.A.; 8 U.S.C.A.; 10 U.S.C.A.; 14 U.S.C.A.; 15
U.S.C.A.; 18 U.S.C.A.; 19 U.S.C.A.; 20 U.S.C.A.; 21 U.S.C.A.; 26 U.S.C.A.; 28 U.S.C.A.; 31
U.S.C.A.; 37 U.S.C.A.; 38 U.S.C.A.; 40 U.S.C.A.; 41 U.S.C.A.; 42 U.S.C.A.; 44 U.S.C.A.; 49
U.S.C.A.; 50 U.S.C.A.).
91. Homeland Security Act § 304(c), 116 Stat. at 2168 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 233 (West 2003
& Supp. 2004)).
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304. For example, it was unclear if persons involved in activities ancillary to
administering the vaccine, such as infection control or contraindication screening,
were covered under section 304's liability provisions.92 As a result, the entire
purpose of Section 304 - ensuring that those involved with making, distributing,
and administering the smallpox vaccine to first responders were protected from
liability - was unclear to key players, and it clearly hindered the preemptive
vaccination effort.
93
In January of 2003, former Secretary of the United States Department of
Health and Human Services, Tommy Thompson, issued a declaration that initiated
the Phase I program and its concomitant liability protections. 94 Cognizant of the
ambiguities in Section 304's coverage described above, he also used the
declaration to broaden liability coverage by including protection for actions
ancillary to the actual smallpox vaccination.95 However, many viewed Secretary
Thompson's efforts as beyond his statutory power.9 6  This only led to more
confusion over Section 304's scope of protection.
With regard to compensation, Section 304 failed to provide an adequate
scheme for those injured by the vaccine. In fact, unlike the Swine Flu Act or
NCVIA, Congress did not create an administrative no-fault system to remedy
injuries and deaths occasioned by the smallpox vaccine. Assuming that a party had
coverage under Section 304, the United States would insert itself in place of the
defendant in lawsuits against covered parties and would assume liability only for
negligent conduct causing injury or death to a smallpox vaccine recipient.97
Therefore, a person injured by a properly manufactured and distributed vaccine,
which was properly prepared and administered, would not receive compensation
under Section 304, even though the vaccine had inherent side effects of varying
severity, including death. 98 As a result, parties injured by a smallpox vaccination
under Phase I had little likelihood of recovering under Section 304.99 In stark
contrast, the Swine Flu Act and NCVIA had no-fault compensation schemes where
injured parties only had to prove that their injuries stemmed from the pertinent
vaccine.100 As a result, claimants in the first two systems were much more likely
to receive compensation.
92. RICHARDS ET AL., supra note 41 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 233(p)(2)(A)(ii), (p)(7)(A)).
93. The Threat of Smallpox, supra note 5.
94. Declaration Regarding Administration of Smallpox Countermeasures, 68 Fed. Reg. 4,212,
4,212 (Jan. 28, 2003).
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., RICHARDS ETAL., supra note 41.
97. 42 U.S.C.A. § 233(p)(I) (West 2003 & Supp. 2004).
98. The Threat of Smallpox, supra note 5.
99. Id.
100. RICHARDS ET AL., supra note 41; Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 57.
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Former Secretary Thompson was aware that Section 304 would rarely
compensate injured vaccinees, but he explained that private insurance or workers'
compensation would cover injuries. 10 ' However, private insurance of this kind is
virtually impossible to secure. 10 2  Furthermore, many doubted that workers'
compensation programs would, in fact, pay these claims. 10 3 And, even if Phase I
injuries were covered by private insurance or workers' compensation, state plans
almost surely did not cover secondary transmission of vaccinia (the virus used to
immunize humans against smallpox) to a family member or casual contact. 10 4
Therefore, uncertainty surrounding the scope of coverage led many first responders
and providers to forego the vaccine altogether.'
0 5
2. Attempting to Improve the Compensation Provisions of Section 304
It was not until April 2003 - three months after Phase I began - that Congress
passed a law, the Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act of 2003106
(SEPPA), to improve upon the compensation provisions of Section 304.
Specifically, SEPPA aimed to "provide benefits and other compensation for certain
individuals with injuries resulting from administration of smallpox
countermeasures."' 0 7 Like the Swine Flu Act and NCVIA, SEPPA created a no-
fault compensation program for vaccinees injured or killed by the smallpox
vaccine. 10 8  SEPPA supplied medical benefits, death benefits, and lost income
benefits for covered injuries,' 09 resulting from countermeasures administered to
101. DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS OF HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., 108TH CONG., A
BIODEFENSE FAILURE: THE NATIONAL SMALLPOX VACCINATION PROGRAM ONE YEAR LATER 13
(2004), http://www.house.gov/hsc/democrats/pdf/press/040129_ABiodefenseFailureOneYearLater.pdf
(last visited Feb. 24, 2005) [hereinafter BIODEFENSE FAILURE] (citing Teleconference with Tommy G.
Thompson, Secretary, Department of Health & Human Services (Dec. 14, 2002) (transcript available at
http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/transcripts/t0212l4.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005)).
102. Implementing the Safety Act: Advancing New Technologies for Homeland Security: Hearing
Before the House Comm. on Government Reform, 108th Cong. 16-17 (2003) (statement of Dr. Penrose
Albright, Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology, Department of Homeland Security).
103. ROBIN J. STRONGIN & EILEEN SALINSKY, NAT'L HEALTH POL'Y FORUM, WHO WILL PAY FOR
THE ADVERSE EVENTS RESULTING FROM SMALLPOX VACCINATION? LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION
ISSUES 8-10 (2003), http://www.nhpf.org/pdfs ib/IB788_Smallpox_3-12-03.pdf (last visited Feb. 24,
2005).
104. Press Release, American Public Health Ass'n, National Public Health Associations Urge
Legislative Action to Protect Smallpox Vaccine Volunteers (Mar. 7, 2003), http://www.apha.org/news/
press/2003/smallpoxvolunteers.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
105. The Threat of Smallpox, supra note 5.
106. Pub. L. No. 108-20, 117 Stat. 638 (2003) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 233, 239 &
239a-h (West 2003 & Supp. 2004)).
107. Id.
108. 42 U.S.C.A. § 239a (West Supp. 2004).
109. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 239c - 239e (West Supp. 2004).
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those volunteering before a confirmed active case of smallpox is discovered
anywhere in the world.l°
However, there are limits to SEPPA's compensation. For example, like
NCVIA, SEPPA's benefits are also secondary to all other sources of
compensation]1 and, the sections of SEPPA limiting lost employment and death
benefits are worded almost identically. 112 In addition, SEPPA imposed caps on
any award, which are more stringent than previous federal vaccine compensation
and liability laws." 13  In particular, SEPPA limited compensation for lost
employment income to two-thirds of the vaccinee's income, providing an
additional 8.3% of their income if the person had one or more dependants,' 1 4 while
NCVIA allowed lost income awards equivalent to "actual and anticipated loss of
earnings.,"'15 SEPPA further limited lost income awards to a maximum of $50,000
per year and a pre-determined lifetime total of $262,100 (as of May 2003) if
injuries were not permanently disabling. 16 Finally, lost income benefits ceased to
be payable if the injured person died and the survivors collected SEPPA's death
benefits. 1 7 These death benefits were limited to a lump sum of $262,100 (as of
May 2003) or a maximum annual payment of $50,000 until the deceased's
youngest dependant reached eighteen years of age.' 1
To be sure, SEPPA remedied some of the confusion over liability protection
offered by Section 304. For example, SEPPA broadened liability coverage to
110. 42 U.S.C.A. § 239(a)(2)(C) (West Supp. 2004). However, those vaccinated after a confirmed
case is discovered receive no compensation under SEPPA. Id.
111. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 239c(b), 239d(c), 239e(b)(3)(B) (West Supp. 2004). Specifically, the section
limiting medical benefits provides:
Payment or reimbursement for services or benefits under subsection (a) of this section
shall be secondary to any obligation of the United States or any third party (including any
State or local governmental entity, private insurance carrier, or employer) under any other
provision of law or contractual agreement, to pay for or provide such services or benefits.
42 U.S.C.A. § 239c(b).
112. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 239d(c) & 239e(a)(3) (West Supp. 2004).
113. 42 U.S.C.A. § 239d(c) (West Supp. 2004). Specifically, the Swine Flu Act did not limit
awards, and NCVIA's caps were generally more generous than SEPPA's caps. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 247b
(West 2003 & Supp. 2004); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300aa-15 & 300aa-16 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004).
114. 42 U.S.C.A. § 239d(b) (West Supp. 2004).
115. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-15(a)(3)(A) (West 2003 & Supp. 2004).
116. 42 U.S.C.A. § 239d(c)(3)(A) (West Supp. 2004); Press Release, DHHS, HHS Proposes
Smallpox Vaccination Compensation Plan (Mar. 5, 2003), http://www.os.dhhs.gov/news/press/
2003pres/20030305.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2005); HHS Plan Would Aid Health Workers Injured by
Smallpox Vaccine, CIDRAP NEWS (Ctr. For Infectious Disease Res. & Pol'y (CIDRAP)) Mar. 6, 2003,
http://www.cidrap.unm.edu/cidrap/content/bt/smallpox/news/compen.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
SEPPA does not create a lifetime limit on lost income benefits for persons permanently disabled by the
smallpox vaccine. 42 U.S.C.A. § 239d(c)(3)(B).
117. 42 U.S.C.A. § 239d(c)(2). (West Supp. 2004).
118. 42 U.S.C.A. § 239e (West Supp. 2004). Of course, the $262,100 death benefit is only $12,100
more than the federal government's original death benefit cap established eighteen years ago under
NCVIA. See id.; 42 U.S.C.A. § 239aa-15 (West Supp. 2004).
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include many areas of concern not specifically addressed by Section 304 of the
Homeland Security Act." 9  Specifically, it provided coverage for healthcare
entities under whose auspices contraindication was conducted. 20  SEPPA also
covered subsequent monitoring, management, or care for the site of vaccination to
provide coverage for the secondary spread of vaccinia and to determine if the
vaccination was successful.' 21 Nonetheless, as shown below, SEPPA's remedies
as a whole were insufficient to make the smallpox initiative successful.
3. Result of the Phase I Smallpox Vaccination Program
Ultimately, the liability protection offered to vaccine providers and the
compensation available to first responders were the major inhibitors to the federal
Phase I vaccination program's success. Even SEPPA's no-fault compensation
package and added liability protections were not enough to invigorate the program.
As of January 31, 2005 (the most recent data available online as of this writing),
only 39,608 first responders have been vaccinated - far short of the government's
goal of 500,000. 122 Former Secretary Thompson himself stated that the smallpox
immunization program "certainly is stalled right now."'' 23  Furthermore, he has
downplayed the government's failure in meeting its goal by contending summarily
that a "vast majority" of states are able to immunize all of their residents within 10
days of a smallpox outbreak. 24  However, Thompson offered no evidence to
suggest that states are actually capable of doing so.' 25 In fact, the only evidence
available suggests the opposite.
For example, Democrats from the House Select Committee on Homeland
Security have reported that as many as twenty states could not vaccinate all their
residents within ten days of an outbreak. 26  Furthermore, as Yale Professor
Edward Kaplan has asserted, a ten day immunization period would require 1.25
million immunized health care workers. 127 Yet, as emphasized above, there are
nowhere near that many immunized health care workers. Therefore, contrary to
the contentions of former Secretary Thompson, states are not prepared to deal with
a possible smallpox outbreak - and certainly not within ten days of the outbreak -
119. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 233 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004).
120. 42 U.S.C.A. § 233(p)(7)(D) (West 2003 & Supp. 2004).
121. Id.
122. CDC SMALLPOX PROGRAM BY STATE, supra note 7.
123. David MeGlinchey, HHS Secretary Says "Vast Majority" of States Ready for Smallpox,
Gov'T EXEC., Jan. 29, 2004, http://www.govexec.condailyfed/0104/012904d2.htm (last visited Feb.
24, 2005).
124. Id.
125. See BIODEFENSE FAILURE, supra note 101, at 5-7, 11; MeGlinchey, supra note 123.
126. BIODEFENSE FAILURE, supra note 101, at 7.
127. MeGlinchey, supra note 123.
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unless a successful pre-event vaccination program is put into place that would
achieve the 1.25 million minimum.
In order for the pre-event smallpox vaccination program - or any pre-event
vaccination program - to be successful, it is critical that a liability and
compensation program be put in place so that providers are protected from liability
and first responders are compensated for the injuries that they may incur as a
result. Otherwise, the cost-benefit analysis will push people away from both
administering and receiving the vaccination. Although DHHS has extended Phase
I for another year, 28 the government will continue to fall far short of its targeted
goal until such a liability and compensation program is implemented.
D. The Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act
Cognizant of SEPPA's shortcomings, some experts are belatedly suggesting
that the solution to the dilemma of vaccine liability protection and compensation
lies in the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act
129
(SAFETY Act). Congress passed the SAFETY Act in November of 2002 (as part
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002) as a response to the growing concern of
liability protection for technologies developed to combat terrorism.' 30 Through
passage of the Act, Congress aimed to ensure that the threat of liability would not
discourage potential development of technologies that could significantly reduce
the risks or mitigate the effects of large-scale acts of terrorism.
131
However, the SAFETY Act is not an attractive option for a viable biodefense
vaccine liability and compensation scheme for the following three reasons. First,
as its legislative history illustrates, the Act was not drafted with biodefense
vaccines in mind. Rather, the purpose of the Act was to encourage the
development of anti-terrorism hardware such as computer systems, explosion
detection services, and audio/video identifiers.1 32 Accordingly, the drafters gave
little - if any - thought to the issue of injury compensation because, unlike
biodefense vaccines, SAFETY Act technologies do not involve intimate contact
with people. Second, even if the SAFETY Act were applicable to biodefense
128. Amendment to Extend the January 24, 2003, Declaration Regarding Administration of
Smallpox Countermeasures, 69 Fed. Reg. 3,920, 3,921 (Jan. 27, 2004); CDC SMALLPOX PROGRAM BY
STATE, supra note 7.
129. Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.A. §§ 441-
44 (West Supp. 2003). For example, Frank M. Rapoport of McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP has asked
the Department of Homeland Security to "consider this possibility." Project BioShield: An Update
from McKenna Long's Frank Rapoport, 12 METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL 25 (July 2004).
130. 6 U.S.C.A. §§ 441-44 (West Supp. 2003).
131. See id.
132. See, e.g., Safety Act: DHS Recognizes Four Technologies, VAR Bus., July 16, 2004,
http://varbusiness.com/article/showArticle.jhtmljsessionid=KOAZS50T2W31MQSNDBCCKHOCJUM
EKJVN?articleld=23901451 (last visited Feb. 24, 2005) [hereinafter Safety Act].
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vaccines, the Act's procedural and insurance requirements are overly burdensome.
In fact, the entire basis of liability protection in the SAFETY Act context hinges
upon the ability to obtain private insurance, 133 which is virtually impossible in the
vaccine context. Thus, it would be extremely difficult to obtain protection for pre-
event biodefense vaccination programs under the Act. Third, even if the
procedural and insurance requirements are satisfied, the level of liability protection
available under the Act is far too broad and would be provided at the expense of
those injured by the vaccine. Therefore, contrary to what has recently become a
fashionable suggestion, the SAFETY Act is not the solution to the dilemma of
vaccine liability protection and compensation.
1. The SAFETY Act is not Applicable to Biodefense Vaccines
As stated above, the SAFETY Act was not drafted with biodefense vaccines
in mind. As its plain language explicitly suggests, the Act was passed to
encourage the development of "equipment," "service[s]," and "devices" that could
prevent, detect, identify, or deter acts of terrorism.1 34 Although certainly capable
of preventing an act of terrorism, biodefense vaccines were not among those
technologies the drafters envisioned for SAFETY Act coverage. Rather, the
drafters envisioned protection for technologies such as security services, electronic
detection devices, and computer surveillance and identification programs.' 35 In
fact, the technologies that are currently covered by the Act include an anthrax-
sniffing device, a giant water pick capable of cutting through steel and concrete,
bomb detection canine teams, and an explosive screening computer system.
136
Further evidence of the drafter's intent lies in the Act's lack of an
administrative compensation scheme. In fact, the only compensation provided is
the ability to sue and win in federal court. More specifically, the SAFETY Act
gives federal district courts original and exclusive jurisdiction over all actions
arising out of qualified anti-terrorism technology (QATT) deployment for injuries
that are "proximately caused" by Sellers. 137 This differs from the previous vaccine
liability and compensation regimes discussed above in that the claims go straight to
federal district court without an administrative hearing. The fact that the drafters
did not even remotely consider implementing any form of administrative
133. 6 U.S.C.A. § 443(a)(1) (West Supp. 2003).
134. 6 U.S.C.A. § 444(1) (West Supp. 2003).
135. Implementing the Safety Act: Advancing New Technologies for Homeland Security: Hearing
Before the House Comm. on Government Reform, 108th Cong. 13 (2003) (statement of Parney Albright,
Assistant Secretary for Plans, Programs and Budgets, Department of Homeland Security) (recognizing
that the SAFETY Act is intended to cover "tangible products, software and services, including support
services") [hereinafter Implementing the Safety Act]; Robert Block & J. Lynn Lansford, U.S. Gives
Liability Protection to Antiterror Firms, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2004, at B2.
136. Safety Act, supra note 132.
137. 6 U.S.C.A. §§ 442(a)(1) & 442(a)(2) (West Supp. 2003).
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compensation can only be indicative of their intention to protect technologies
(unlike biodefense vaccines) that require little - if any - human contact. This
virtually eliminates the need for a compensation scheme. Due to the types of
technologies the SAFETY Act drafters intended to protect, concern for potential
injuries was virtually non-existent. If the drafters had envisioned the SAFETY Act
to apply to biodefense vaccines, they would have had no choice but to incorporate
at least some form of compensation package - just as every other vaccine
immunization program has done in the past. Yet, the SAFETY Act has no such
package.
In addition, despite predating the smallpox program by only two months, the
SAFETY Act was never mentioned by any party - including Congress - during
implementation of either Section 304 or SEPPA. If the Act was truly drafted with
biodefense vaccines in mind, it certainly would have been suggested as a possible
solution to the liability and compensation concerns of the Phase I smallpox
program during the administrative and legislative discussions that took place in late
2002 and early 2003.
2. The SAFETYAct's Requirements are Overly Burdensome
Even if the SAFETY Act was drafted with biodefense vaccines in mind, the
Act's procedural and insurance requirements are so burdensome that it would be
virtually impossible to obtain vaccine liability protection under the Act.
Specifically, there are four requirements that must be met before complete liability
protection is available.
First, the entity seeking protection must fit within the definition of a "Seller."
The Act defines a Seller as "[a]ny person or entity that sells or otherwise provides
a qualified anti-terrorism technology to Federal and non-Federal Government
customers.' 3 8 In addition, the term "Seller" also appears to cover manufacturers
and distributors.' 39 This assessment is confirmed by the SAFETY Act's interim
regulations' definition of "Seller" as "any person or entity to whom or to which (as
appropriate) a Designation has been issued under this Part (unless the context
requires otherwise).' 140 However, it is doubtful that the term "Seller" would cover
those involved with administering a vaccine, such as hospitals or local health
departments. 141
138. 6 U.S.C.A. § 443(a)(1) (West Supp. 2003).
139. 6 U.S.C.A. § 443(a)(3) (West Supp. 2003).
140. Regulations Implementing the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies
(SAFETY) Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 59,684, 59,704 (proposed October 16, 2003) (to be codified at 6
C.F.R. pt. 25).
141. Nonetheless, while those that administer the biodefense vaccine may not get protection as a
Seller, they will likely get some liability protection from the insurance that a Seller is required to
maintain under the SAFETY Act. However, such coverage is ambiguous at best.
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Second, the Seller must achieve designation for their product as a Qualified
Anti-Terrorism Technology (QATT). 142  A QATT encompasses products
"developed" for the very purpose of "preventing" and "limiting the harm" caused
by an act of terrorism. 143 However, designees must satisfy a non-exclusive list of
determinative criteria,' 44 including, inter alia, an assessment of the magnitude of
risk exposure to the public if the technology was not available, 145 scientific
evidence of a technology's effectiveness, 146 and availability for immediate
deployment. 147  The designation requirement becomes increasingly onerous for
biodefense vaccines because of the added difficulty in assessing a vaccine's
effectiveness and the risks associated with its administration.
Third, after designation, the Seller's product becomes eligible for
certification and placement on the Approved Product List for Homeland Security,
142. 6 U.S.C.A. § 444(1) (West Supp. 2003). This section defines qualified anti-terrorism as:
any product, equipment, service (including support services), device, or technology
(including information technology) designed, developed, modified, or procured for the
specific purpose of preventing, detecting, identifying, or deterring acts of terrorism or
limiting the harm such acts might otherwise cause, that is designated as such by the
Secretary.
Id.
143. Id.
144. 6 U.S.C.A. § 441(b) (West Supp. 2003). To qualify for designation as a QATT, the
technology must adhere to the following:
(b) Designation of qualified anti-terrorism technologies- The Secretary may designate
anti-terrorism technologies that qualify for protection under the system of risk
management set forth in this part in accordance with criteria that shall include, but not be
limited to, the following:
(1) Prior United States Government use or demonstrated substantial utility
and effectiveness.
(2) Availability of the technology for immediate deployment in public and
private settings.
(3) Existence of extraordinarily large or extraordinarily unquantifiable
potential third party liability risk exposure to the Seller or other provider of
such anti-terrorism technology.
(4) Substantial likelihood that such anti-terrorism technology will not be
deployed unless protections under the system of risk management provided
under this subtitle are extended.
(5) Magnitude of risk exposure to the public if such anti-terrorism
technology is not deployed.
(6) Evaluation of all scientific studies that can be feasibly conducted in order
to assess the capability of the technology to substantially reduce risks of
harm.
(7) Anti-terrorism technology that would be effective in facilitating the
defense against acts of terrorism, including technologies that prevent, defeat
or respond to such acts.
Id.
145. 6 U.S.C.A. § 441(b)(5) (West Supp. 2003).
146. 6 U.S.C.A. § 441(b)(6) (West Supp. 2003).
147. 6 U.S.C.A. § 441(b)(2) (West Supp. 2003).
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which provides the Seller with an even greater level of liability protection. In
order to become certified, the Secretary must review the product and determine
whether it will perform as intended, conform to the manufacturer's specifications,
and be safe for its intended use. 148 If the product meets these three criteria, the
Secretary will issue a certificate of conformance to the Seller and place the QATT
on the Approved Product List for Homeland Security. 149  Certification, like
designation, becomes increasingly difficult for biodefense vaccines. Specifically,
unlike computer systems or electronic identifiers, biodefense vaccines are often
much more speculative in nature with regards to how they will perform.
Furthermore, safety determinations pertaining to vaccines, as opposed to
computers, are not within the statutory authority of the Secretary; rather, those
determinations are to be made by the FDA.
150
Fourth, and perhaps the biggest obstacle to obtaining complete liability
protection under the Act, the Seller must conform to several insurance
requirements, regardless of whether its product has achieved certification or just
designation. In fact, if the Sellers do not satisfy the insurance requirements, their
designations and/or certifications become obsolete.' 15  Specifically, the Act
requires both designees and those with certification to obtain liability insurance.
152
This insurance covers the contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, vendors, and
customers of the manufacturer.' 53 It also covers the contractors, subcontractors,
suppliers, and vendors of the customer. 154  Moreover, Sellers, as well as the
Sellers' contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, vendors, and customers, are
protected from claims arising out of the "sale, use, or operation" of the QATT
during the response or recovery phase of an act of terrorism.' 55
Next, the Sellers must purchase a specified amount of insurance "reasonably
available from private sources on the world market at prices and terms that will not
unreasonably distort the sales price of [the manufacturers'] anti-terrorism
148. 6 U.S.C.A. § 442(d)(2) (West Supp. 2003). However, the Secretary does not necessarily
certify all of the QATTs he designates.
149. 6 U.S.C.A. § 442(d)(3) (West Supp. 2003).
150. See FDA, DHHS, FDA AND THE DRUG DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: HOW THE AGENCY ENSURES
THAT DRUGS ARE SAFE AND EFFECTIVE (Feb. 2002), http://www.fda.gov/opacom/factsheets/ustthe
facts/17drgdev.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2005) (noting that the FDA conducts a "rigorous review" to
ensure that drugs meet the "highest scientific standards").
151. See 6 U.S.C.A. § 443(a)(1) (West Supp. 2003).
152. 6 U.S.C.A. § 443(a)(1) (West Supp. 2003). "Any person or entity that sells or otherwise
provides a qualified anti-terrorism technology to Federal and non-Federal Government customers
("Seller") shall obtain liability insurance ... ." Id.
153. 6 U.S.C.A. § 443(a)(3)(A) (West Supp. 2003).
154. 6 U.S.C.A. § 443(a)(3)(B) (West Supp. 2003).
155. 6 U.S.C.A. § 443(a)(3) (West Supp. 2003). Accordingly, an administrator of a biodefense
vaccine would be covered by the vaccine manufacturer's liability insurance if something were to go
wrong while administering the vaccine.
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technologies."' 56  In addition, Sellers must enter into a "reciprocal waiver of
claims" with all of their business correspondents. 157 In this waiver, the parties
agree to be "responsible for losses ... sustain[ed] ... when qualified anti-terrorism
technologies have been deployed."'
158
However, as testimony before the Committee on House Reform reflects,
"insurance has become largely unattainable or so costly as to leave the
technologies in question without a market.' ' 159 This is largely attributed to the
difficulty in quantifying "[t]he potential risks and liabilities that stem from the
technologies deployed in our war against terrorism."' 160  Biodefense vaccines
present especially difficult challenges in this regard due to the added complexity of
compensation. Furthermore, even if a vaccine manufacturer or provider is able to
obtain insurance, the level obtained is often not enough to minimize the risk of
liability to an acceptable level. For example, VaxGen - one of two firms under
government contract to produce and test a new anthrax vaccine - faces potential
liability that "will most likely exceed what the commercial insurance market [has
provided them]."'' Therefore, even if a vaccine manufacturer or provider is able
to circumvent the many obstacles in obtaining insurance, the level obtained will
almost certainly not be enough to minimize the risk of liability to an acceptable
level.
In any event, even without the added complexities of offering protection of
biodefense vaccines, the SAFETY Act has struggled to attract Sellers (of other
anti-terrorism technologies) to its liability package. In fact, as a general matter,
only nineteen out of the expected 500 companies have applied for the Act's
protection, and only four of those companies have actually obtained protection
under the Act.' 6 2 If the SAFETY Act is suddenly offered to Sellers of biodefense
vaccines as well, the percentage of those applying for and/or obtaining SAFETY
Act protection will be even smaller.
3. Different Degrees ofLiability Protection under the SAFETY Act
Even if a Seller is actually able to overcome all of the procedural (i.e.,
designation and certification) and insurance requirements, the liability protection
offered by the SAFETY Act is problematic. As shown below, the liability
156. 6 U.S.C.A. § 443(a)(2) (West Supp. 2003).
157. See 6 U.S.C.A. § 443(b) (West Supp. 2003).
158. Id.
159. Implementing the Safety Act, supra note 135, at 12.
160. Id
161. Biotechnology; BioShield Shortcomings Subject of Industry Conference, BIOTERRORISM WK.
(NewsRx.com & NewsRx.net), June 28, 2004, at 8, available at 2004 WL 55187482.
162. Gail Repsher Emery, Four Companies are First to Get Safety Act Protection, 19 WASHINGTON
TECH. (June 18, 2004), http://www.washingtontechnology.com/news/l_1/dailynews/23831-1.html
(last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
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protection provided by the Act is so complete and absolute that those injured by
the technology have little ability to be compensated.
The first level of liability protection under the SAFETY Act is provided if the
Seller has achieved QATT designation for their product. Under this level of
protection, plaintiffs are prohibited from receiving punitive damages 63 and/or
proceeding under a theory of joint and several liability of the Sellers and their
business counterparts. 64 In addition, Sellers are only responsible for noneconomic
damages 165 in an amount directly proportional to the percentage of responsibility of
the manufacturer for harm to the plaintiff. 66 Furthermore, no plaintiff can receive
noneconomic damages unless the plaintiff suffered physical harm.' 67  The
SAFETY Act also limits the amount of recovery for plaintiffs by installing a cap
on liability for the Seller. 68 Moreover, any recovery by a plaintiff is reduced by
the amount of the plaintiffs collateral source compensation.
69
Despite these protections, the SAFETY Act does not provide liability
protection to designees comparable to the Swine Flu Act, NCVIA, and Section 304
of the Homeland Security Act. In particular, the SAFETY Act does not go so far
as to immunize sellers from most liability. Certainly, under the SAFETY Act, the
Sellers will not have to pay the awards, because their liability is capped at the level
of their insurance. However, the Seller will ultimately pay that cost anyway since
insurance companies will pass those costs on to their customers in increased
premiums. The SAFETY Act also does not assist financially with any adverse
decisions against the Seller (i.e., the federal government does not operate a
compensation fund as it does in the three vaccine programs discussed above, which
makes direct payments to an injured person.) The equity of the compensation will
depend on the insurance policy, which can change from term to term, and, as a
result, it would be difficult for a vaccinee to determine his or her level of
compensation before receiving a vaccination. Therefore, if a Seller is only able to
achieve QATT designation (and not certification) for its product, the level of
liability protection provided - while substantial - is not as broad as that provided
in the Swine Flu Act, NCVIA, and/or Section 304 of the Homeland Security Act.
163. 6 U.S.C.A. § 442(b)(1) (West Supp. 2003).
164. 6 U.S.C.A. § 442(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2003).
165. 6 U.S.C.A. § 442(b)(2) (West Supp. 2003). The term noneconomic damages means "damages
for losses for physical and emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental
anguish, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society and companionship, loss of
consortium, hedonic damages, injury to reputation, and any other nonpecuniary losses." 6 U.S.C.A. §
442(b)(2)(B).
166. 6 U.S.C.A. § 442(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2003).
167. Id.
168. 6 U.S.C.A. § 443(c) (West Supp. 2003). The manufacturer's liability will not be in excess of
an amount greater than the manufacturer's liability insurance coverage. Id.
169. 6 U.S.C.A. § 442(c) (West Supp. 2003).
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A second - even greater - level of protection is available to the Seller under
the SAFETY Act if the Seller is also able to achieve certification (in addition to
designation) for its product. In particular, once the Secretary certifies the QATT
and places it on the Approved Product List for Homeland Security, the Seller is
afforded the government contractor defense, which, if asserted successfully,
provides the Seller with nearly absolute immunity. 70  The importance of this
defense lies not only in the protection it provides for the Seller, but also in the
difficulty it establishes for plaintiffs to recover.
171
The government contractor defense 172 is an affirmative defense that
immunizes Sellers from liability for certain claims from third parties injured by the
Seller's QATT.'7 3  The defense broadly and completely protects manufacturers
from being held liable for design defects or failure to warn claims. 74 The Supreme
Court created this defense in order to encourage contractor participation in the
design and manufacturing process of products used by the government. 75 The
defense is nearly impermeable and a rebuttable presumption is overcome only by a
showing that the Seller acted "fraudulently" or "with willful misconduct" when
applying for liability protection under the SAFETY Act. 17 6 Therefore, a Seller
with the protection of the government contractor defense is shielded from liability
for almost all claims arising out of injuries as a result of the deployment of the
Seller's QATT, leaving injured parties without compensation. If applied to
biodefense vaccines, this protection would be far too broad - especially in the
context of first responders, who will be even less likely to volunteer if they know
from the outset that the vaccine is certified - and thus protect manufacturers and
health providers from virtually all liability.
170. 6 U.S.C.A. § 442(d)(l)-(3) (West Supp. 2003). Moreover, once the Seller achieves
certification, there is "a rebuttable presumption" that the government contractor defense applies. 6
U.S.C.A. § 442(d)(1).
171. See Regulations Implementing the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies
Act of 2002 (the SAFETY Act), 68 Fed. Reg. at 59,691.
172. Originally formulated in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1998), the
government contractor defense is available when the following elements are proven: "(1) the United
States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications;
and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were
known to the supplier but not to the United States." Id.
173. Regulations Implementing the SAFETY Act, 68 Fed. Reg. at 59,691. The defense is not only
available to government contractors but to state and local governments as well as to the private sector.
Id.
174. Id.
175. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512-13.
176. 6 U.S.C.A. § 442(d)(1) (West Supp. 2003). Even if a plaintiff were able to prove a Seller
"acted fraudulently" or "with willful misconduct," the plaintiff's compensation would still be limited by
the liability protections afforded to a QATT designee, as listed above.
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4. Final Analysis of the SAFETY Act
In the final analysis, the SAFETY Act does not offer the kind of liability
and compensation scheme that would make it an attractive biodefense pre-event
vaccination program. First, as is evident by its legislative history and lack of a
sufficient compensation scheme, the SAFETY Act was not intended to apply to
biodefense vaccines. Second, even if it were, the Act is filled with overly
burdensome insurance requirements that make obtaining protection under the Act
extremely rare, regardless of whether the Secretary designates and/or certifies the
Seller's product. And, in the context of biodefense vaccines, the task of obtaining
insurance becomes especially problematic. Third, even in the unlikely event that a
biodefense vaccine Seller is actually able to satisfy all of the procedural (i.e.,
designation and certification) and insurance requirements necessary to trigger
SAFETY Act application, the liability protection available is far too broad,
offering virtually no compensation to those harmed by the vaccination. Even if the
Seller is only able to achieve designation (and not certification) for their vaccine,
liability protection is still too broad, offering compensation that is vastly limited, as
determined by the Seller's insurer. Therefore, regardless of the level of liability
protection available, the Seller is protected at the expense of those injured by the
vaccination. As such, the Act is not an attractive option for a pre-event biodefense
vaccination program.
II. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE PHASE I SMALLPOX VACCINATION PROGRAM:
PREPARING FOR FUTURE PRE-EVENT BIODEFENSE VACCINATIONS
While several factors have contributed to the federal Phase I vaccination
program's collapse, the study conducted by the ANSER Institute for Homeland
Security showed that the most significant reason is the ineffective liability and
compensation scheme created by Congress.' 77  Understandably, the federal
government does not want to embroil itself in vaccine claims in either the
administrative or legal systems; however, the history of federal vaccine programs
since the 1970s has shown that a generous liability and compensation scheme is
vital to ensuring the success of a pre-event vaccination program.
A. Liability
Beginning with the Swine Flu Act of 1976 and continuing with NCVIA in
1986, it is clear that vaccine manufacturers (and others in the chain of distribution)
demand liability protection from the federal government in the absence of
177. The Threat of Smallpox, supra note 5.
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insurance coverage. Congress largely gave manufacturers and distributors
adequate liability protection. However, as the failure of Section 304 demonstrated,
it is crucial to define the scope of coverage unambiguously. 178 More specifically,
under Section 304, hospitals and public health departments had little incentive to
vaccinate workers because they could not ascertain the extent of their liability for
biodefense vaccine-related injuries and deaths. Manufacturers, distributors, and
those parties involved with the vaccination 179 must be assured that the government
stands ready to assume liability for any adverse effects from a preemptive
biodefense vaccination effort, except liability that results from grossly negligent,
reckless, or intentional conduct. Therefore, Section 304 serves as a warning to
future pre-event biodefense vaccination programs that liability coverage must be
broad and precise.
Unambiguous liability protection will almost certainly be more important in
future pre-event biodefense vaccination programs because the vaccine's risks may
be relatively unknown. In contrast, the efficacy, side-effects, and contraindications
of the smallpox vaccine were well documented, 180 (with the exception of the cases
of myocarditis and periocarditis allegedly linked to the smallpox vaccine), 18 and
parties could estimate the likelihood of injury. However, in future vaccination
programs, we almost certainly will not know exactly how well a vaccine performs
until a vaccinated human is exposed to a certain agent.1 82  Accordingly, the
effectiveness of a vaccine can only truly be determined for diseases that are
naturally occurring, such as Ebola, by vaccinating persons likely to come in
contact with the disease. But, as a result, claims will inevitably arise that allege the
vaccine did not provide a suitable level of protection. Furthermore, side-effects
that did not present themselves during testing may become apparent during a
vaccination program, such as the emergence of Guillian-Barre syndrome
178. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
179. Certainly, federal liability protection should also cover non-negligent, secondary transmissions
resulting from vaccines that contain communicable diseases.
180. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, REACTIONS AFTER SMALLPOX
VACCINATION (2002), at http://www.smallpox.gov/VaccineSideEffects.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2005).
181. The Threat of Smallpox, supra note 5. However, the New York City Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene recently conducted a historical review of data from a mass smallpox vaccination of
New York City in 1947 which revealed that the smallpox vaccine likely poses little to no risk of cardiac
death. Thomas Frieden et al., Cardiac Deaths After A Mass Vaccination Campaign - New York City,
1947, 52 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. 933 (OCT. 3,2003), http://www.edc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/
mm5239.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2005); Richard Perez-Pena, Checking City's Archives to Solve a
Medical Mystery, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2003, at B2, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/l0/03/nyregion/
03SMAL.html?ex = 1089864000&en=9ce12e92d338d2c1&ei=5070 (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
182. It is unethical for researchers to intentionally expose humans to diseases such as smallpox that
do not exist in nature. Griff Witte, Government Considers New Smallpox Vaccine, WASH. POST, Apr.
15, 2004, at El, available at 2004 WL 74480051.
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frequently associated with the swine flu vaccine. 183 Therefore, any new vaccine
could cause unanticipated injuries. Certainly, parties involved with the
manufacture, distribution, and administration of the next generation biodefense
vaccines will want adequate assurances of protection before those vaccines are
used by first responders or the general public.
In terms of a liability regime's procedure in a pre-event context, the
government should insert itself as the defendant in any claim, so that
manufacturers, distributors, and administrators need not be directly involved in
litigating claims. Liability, as well as compensation, should be handled
exclusively in an administrative hearing process, much like that of the NCVIA.
8 4
This would reduce the risk of litigation to vaccine administrators and provide
vaccinees with a greater guarantee of compensation in the event that they are
injured by the vaccination.15 Both of these suggestions would sharply curtail the
transactional costs associated with litigating claims. Finally, unlike what
transpired in the Phase I smallpox program, a full liability and compensation
scheme should be in place before any "pre-emptive" vaccination program begins.
B. Compensation
The success of a compensation program is closely linked to the federal
government's ability to clearly articulate an imminent bioterrorist threat. 8 6 High
vaccine risk coupled with low or ambiguous threat of bioterrorist attack will cause
prospective vaccinees to weigh heavily vaccine injury compensation in their
personal risk-benefit calculus. 87 In so doing, they may determine that the risk of
known or potentially unknown side effects of a biodefense vaccine outweighs the
183. RICHARDS ET AL., supra note 41. As Professors Richards, Peltier, and Rathbun illustrate, the
epidemiology of Guillian-Barre Syndrome (GBS) was primarily driven by plaintiffis attorneys and
"friendly doctors" that readily attributed GBS to the swine flu vaccine. Id. To be sure, vaccine injury
tables associated with future biodefense vaccines for which we will not have highly developed injury
and mortality data will need to be developed as a vaccination program is launched. A well developed
list of injuries for a new vaccine may not exist even after clinical trials, so the causal relationships
between injury and a vaccine may need to be developed in court or an administrative hearing. See
Edward Richards, Presentation at the University of Maryland's Symposium Eliminating Legal,
Regulatory, and Economic Barriers to Biodefense Vaccine Development (June 9, 2004), (digital audio
recording), available at http://media.umaryland.edu:8080/ramgen/oea/vaccine conf/VACCINE_
2004_RICHARDSQA.rm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005). While a comprehensive discussion of this
problem is beyond the scope of this article, one possibility may be to use court appointed experts to give
testimony on whether a given injury has been caused by a vaccine.
184. Lauren Hammer Breslow, Note, The Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act of 2002: The Rise
of the Voluntary Incentive Structure and Congressional Refusal to Require Pediatric Testing, 40 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 133, 190 (2003).
185. Id.
186. The Threat of Smallpox, supra note 5.
187. Id.
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risk of coming into contact with a disease. 18 8 This may be especially true if an
adequate compensation program does not exist. Each of these variables was
present at the beginning of the Phase I program, including the almost complete
absence of a federal system to compensate smallpox vaccine injuries or fatalities.
In the case of the federal Phase I program, the Bush Administration clearly
sent mixed messages regarding the probability of terrorists using smallpox as a
weapon. When President Bush formally announced the Phase I program in
December of 2002, he stated, "One potential danger to America is the use of the
smallpox virus as a weapon of terror .... We know, however, that the smallpox
virus still exits in laboratories, and we believe that regimes hostile to the United
States may possess this dangerous virus."' 89 However, in the same speech he
expressed the administration's belief that a smallpox attack was not "imminent."' 90
Furthermore, a little more than a month before President Bush's announcement,
D.A. Henderson, a highly respected science adviser for the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, said, "I think we're looking at [smallpox] at this point
as a low risk of it being used as a weapon.,' 191 This ambiguity helped doom Phase
I. Certainly, the federal government will need to make a better effort to determine
whether first responders need to receive biodefense vaccines, and then
communicate the need for them to get vaccinated. Accordingly, adequate threat
communication must be concomitant with a robust compensation program.
Moreover, a federal liability and compensation program must be in place
before any pre-event biodefense vaccinations begin. The Phase I smallpox
vaccination program taught us an important lesson: that without adequate
compensation, it will be difficult to attract volunteer vaccinees. Indeed, days
before President Bush formally announced the Phase I vaccination program,
Service Employees International Union (SEIU), America's largest health care
worker union, demanded that a "simple and fair compensation system - like
[NCVIA] - should be made available to assist anyone who is injured from
receiving the vaccine or coming into contact with someone who received it."''
92
The limited compensation package offered by Section 304 failed to encourage first
responders to volunteer for vaccination. Furthermore, even SEPPA's improved
compensation scheme did little to increase participation in the program. In
188. The risk of coming into contact with some Category A bioterrorist agents in nature is very low.
For example, smallpox has been eradicated from the world, except for a few samples stored in Atlanta,
Georgia, and Russia. The Threat of Smallpox, supra note 5.
189. White House Press Release, supra note 85.
190. Id.
191. David Ruppe, HHS Official Says Threat of Smallpox Attack Low, GOV'T EXEC., Nov. 7, 2002,
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1 102/110702gsn I .htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
192. Press Release, Service Employees International Union, Nation's Largest Health Care Union
Warns That, Without Better Safeguards, Plan Itself Poses Public Health Risks (Dec. 3, 2002),
http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/bt/smallpox/SEIU-smallpox-.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
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particular, the limits and caps SEPPA placed on awards were more stringent than
the previous federal vaccination programs, and thus less attractive to first
responders.
Compensation should also restore injured vaccinees to their pre-injury
positions. As mentioned above, SEPPA generally offered benefits that were less
generous than those provided by either NCVIA or the Swine Flu Immunization
Program. 93 In some cases, SEPPA's lost wages benefits for injured vaccinees do
not maintain a high wage earner's (or their family's) standard of living. In the
absence of an imminent bioterrorist threat, future biodefense vaccine compensation
programs need to increase caps on injury, death, and lost wages awards, so that
vaccinees are compensated more consistently with their current standard of living.
Perhaps the language used in NCVIA, 194 that provides a formula to calculate an
individual's lost wages, would be appropriate. Certainly, when a prospective
biodefense vaccinee discovers that their household income would be markedly
reduced if they were forced to rely on a federal compensation program, that person
almost certainly will decide not to receive the vaccination.
Finally, federal biodefense compensation programs should also be easily
accessible and offer "one-stop" shopping (i.e., do not make federal compensation
secondary to all other types of compensation, such as private health insurance and
workers' compensation). On a personal level, potential volunteers may very well
be confused and angry about the prospect of dealing with various sources of
potential compensation to determine what revenue source should be compensating
them. On a policy level, the adverse effects of a federal vaccination program (i.e.,
compensation for vaccine related injuries and deaths) should not be cast upon the
states, employers (through workers' compensation premiums), or private health
insurers (which in turn will increase personal premiums). However, if federal
biodefense vaccine compensation is made secondary to other sources of recovery,
employers such as hospitals should be compensated for increased workers
compensation premiums that may result from vaccinating employees.
Additionally, the federal government should compensate employers if they need to
furlough employees after they receive a vaccine.
C Cost
Some assert that the abovementioned recommendations for a biodefense
vaccine liability and compensation scheme would be too costly for the federal
government. 95 However, when considering the Phase I smallpox program in
comparison to other compensation programs, the cost is negligible. For example,
193. See supra notes 106-120 and accompanying text.
194. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-15(a)(3) (West 2003 & Supp. 2004).
195. The Threat of Smallpox, supra note 5.
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as of January 28, 2005, the federal government has paid out a total of over $629
million for 1,249 awards in NCVIA claims and attorneys' fees for childhood
vaccine injuries since 1990.196 That class is not only much larger than that of the
Phase I smallpox vaccination program, which has only 500,000 prospective
vaccinees for whom the United States would need to compensate (in the worst case
scenario), 197 but it is also continuously growing. Even the ten million vaccinee
figure projected for the Phase II smallpox vaccination is relatively small compared
to the number of child vaccines under NCVIA, which requires every child in the
United States, barring minor exceptions, to receive childhood vaccination as a
prerequisite to entering school.1
98
In addition, outside the realm of vaccine compensation, the September 1 th
Victims Compensation Fund of 2001199 will pay approximately 5,000 families
nearly $7 billion.20 0 The goal of that Act was not only to compensate victims, but
also to offer liability protection to airlines so that their operations would remain
viable. 20' Furthermore, in the Fall of 2003, Congress appropriated approximately
$87 billion to sustain the "war on terror" in Afghanistan and Iraq for one year.20 2
Congress also recently approved a $25 billion supplemental request, and Pentagon
officials will soon ask the Bush administration for an additional $80 billion to help
fund the "military presence" in Iraq and Afghanistan.2 3 If vaccinations truly are
an integral part of our national defense strategy, pre-event biodefense vaccine
compensation and liability regimes are no less important than compensating
September 11 th victims or military operations in the war on terror. Pre-event
biodefense vaccination programs are not where the government should be
attempting to "save" funds.
Rather, the federal government must improve upon the previous liability and
compensation schemes discussed above and recognize that providing liability
196. HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL
VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM MONTHLY STATISTICS REPORT (Dec. 1, 2004),
http://www.hrsa.gov/osp/vicp/monthlystatspost.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
197. Even if this figure were increased to include the family members of first responders, it is still
relatively small in comparison to those that required vaccination under NCVIA.
198. K. Shaw et al., Vaccination Coverage Among Children Entering School in United States,
2002-03 School Year, 52 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 791 (Aug. 22, 2003), http://www.cdc.
gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5233a3.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
199, The September 1 th Victims Compensation Fund of 2001 was created on Sept. 22, 2001, by
the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (codified
as amended at 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004)).
200, David W. Chen, After Weighing Value of Lives, 9/11 Fund Completes Its Task, N.Y. TIMES,
June 16, 2004, at Al.
201. 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2004).
202. Helen Dewar, Senate Approves $87 Billion for Iraq; Bush Gets Package Largely as Requested,
WASH. POST., Nov. 4, 2003, at Al.
203. Greg Jaffe & Jackie Calmes, Pentagon to Seek $80 Billion More" Request to Help Finance
Iraq, Afghanistan Presence is Bigger than Expected, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2004, at A4.
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protection and adequate compensation for biodefense vaccinations is part of the
cost of doing business. For example, a cost-benefit analysis would reveal that the
dangers of a smallpox outbreak far outweigh the cost of paying the potential claims
of injured vaccinees in a pre-event phase. As the CDC explains, smallpox is a
"serious, contagious, and sometimes fatal infectious disease. 2 °4 Furthermore, the
effects of a smallpox outbreak were explored in Dark Winter, a two day role-
playing exercise based on a fictional bioterrorist smallpox attack.20 5 Specifically,
Dark Winter demonstrated that the impact of a smallpox attack would likely
include overcrowded emergency rooms, large angry crowds demanding
vaccination, closures of transportation links, food shortages, and billions of dollars
in international trade losses.2 °6 In addition, the infection rate would increase
tenfold every two to three weeks, translating into thirty million cases and ten
million deaths by the fifth wave. 207 Cognizant of the catastrophic consequences of
a smallpox outbreak, the best approach is to mitigate the damage of an attack via
pre-event vaccination. 20 In order to do so, the federal government must begin by
assuming more of the financial responsibility.
IV. CONCLUSION
In order to avoid future failures of pre-event vaccinations programs such as
the Phase I smallpox initiative, the federal government must unambiguously
convey the threat of a particular agent, provide clear and comprehensive liability
immunity to those administering the vaccine, and adequately compensate those that
are injured by the vaccination. The cost of providing such a pre-event liability and
compensation scheme is a relatively small price to pay when compared to what the
price would likely be at the post-event stage. At the pre-event stage, the
population targeted for vaccination is manageable and the risks of receiving the
vaccination are calculable. In contrast, once an outbreak occurs, the cost of
confronting the catastrophic consequences that emerge grows exponentially -
especially without the benefit of vaccinated first responders. The government must
204. CDC, SMALLPOX DISEASE OVERVIEW, at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/overview/
disease-facts.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2005) (stating that smallpox has a fatality rate of approximately
30%).
205. Dark Winter: A Bioterrorism Exercise, BIOHAZARD NEWS, SCENARIOS: SMALLPOX (June
2001), at http://www.biohazardnews.net/scen smallpox.shtml (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. CDC, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT A SMALLPOX OUTBREAK, http://www.bt.edc.gov/
agent/smallpox/basics/pdf/outbreak.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
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recognize that the cost of pre-event vaccination programs is relatively small and a
necessary cost of doing business in the post 9/11 world.
